Box 2.3 The sovereign-bank nexus by Banco de España
In certain contexts, the existence of a high number of 
financial interconnections between banks and the public 
sector may pose risks to financial stability. The 
interconnections exist primarily because banks are 
typically significant holders of government debt securities 
and, furthermore, fiscal intervention is perceived as being 
the last resort in the event the banking sector faces 
solvency problems. Potential banking system or sovereign 
problems may result in a doom loop. The doom loop 
between the banking system and the sovereign 
materialised directly following the global financial crisis 
and in the subsequent sovereign debt crisis of 2012 which 
affected several European countries. In the wake of the 
global pandemic, the ICO guarantees represent an 
interconnection shared by banks and the public sector 
with the corporate sector.1 This box aims to describe how 
these nexus work and review the materiality of the risk to 
the Spanish banking system stemming from the 
interconnections with the sovereign after the outbreak of 
the global pandemic.
The sovereign-bank nexus can create feedback loops 
through two fundamental channels, as shown in Figure 1, 
which are separate from the indirect nexus with the non-
financial corporate sector.2 First, problems in the banking 
system spread to the sovereign when the latter is expected 
to bail out a bank. Here, the expected budgetary cost 
associated with the bail-out increases the sovereign’s 
financing costs. Second, a drop in the price of sovereign 
debt impairs banks’ sovereign debt holdings on their 
balance sheets. This is particularly pronounced when 
these holdings are significant and are mostly measured at 
market value. This spillover from the sovereign to banks 
drives up the cost of bank financing. Consequently, 
lending by the banking system contracts, generating a 
tightened “liquidity channel” (see Bocola (2016))3. 
In both cases there may be feedback loops, as higher 
financing costs for the sovereign have an adverse effect on 
banks’ balance sheets as holders of sovereign debt, and 
vice versa. In addition, the widespread increase in financing 
costs reduces economic growth. This has adverse 
implications both for the quality of banks’ balance sheets 
and for government budget balances.
Banks’ government debt holdings are key in the sovereign-
bank nexus. These holdings are justified, among other 
reasons, due to banks’ need to hold liquid assets on their 
balance sheets; government debt tends to be the safest 
and most liquid asset on the financial markets. Indeed, 
general government debt holdings account for the largest 
share of Spanish banks’ debt securities (see Chart 1). 
Spanish banks’ exposure to sovereign risk through these 
holdings has remained relatively stable since December 
2019 (between 9.1% and 10.5% of total consolidated 
assets). This contrasts with the sharp rise in bank lending 
to the private sector during the initial phases of the 
pandemic. 
As a percentage of total assets, Spanish banks’ holdings 
of Spanish sovereign debt are greater than those of 
French and German banks, but smaller than those of 
Italian banks. However, it should be noted that Spanish 
and Italian banks’ greater exposure largely originated 
from the global financial crisis. This is particularly true in 
the case of Spanish banks. Indeed, during the years 
leading up to the pandemic, the Spanish banking sector 
had gradually reduced its exposure to the Spanish 
sovereign. The COVID-19 crisis disrupted this trend, albeit 
without increasing exposure, as occurred during the 
global financial crisis (see Chart 3). Specifically, the main 
Spanish banks’ holdings of government debt, as a 
percentage of total assets, fell slightly during the 
pandemic. The decrease was greater in fair-value debt 
holdings, which are those that create greater exposure to 
the doom loop, as their valuation is updated automatically 
on the basis of debt market fluctuations (see Chart 4). 
This trend is similar to that of other euro area banking 
systems, except Italy, where these holdings have risen.  
Finally, in the wake of the global pandemic, the corporate 
sector’s financial problems could become central to the 
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sovereign-bank nexus owing to the loan guarantee scheme 
for firms established by the ICO. Indeed, the policies 
implemented to channel credit to the corporate sector 
through ICO guarantees has led to an increase in the 
sovereign’s contingent liabilities. The volume of ICO-backed 
lending to the corporate sector was close to 9% of GDP in 
June 2021, almost doubling the previous year’s figure. This 
means that the banking sector would be less exposed to the 
potential impairment of loans to the corporate sector, since 
the public guarantees cover a significant portion of its loan 
portfolio. Specifically, loans with ICO guarantees account for 
25% of total lending to the corporate sector and are 
equivalent to 40% of bank capital. However, an adverse 
shock to the sovereign would eventually affect the banking 
sector, through the feedback loop described above. 
Economic policy action can significantly mitigate the 
risks of the sovereign-bank nexus. In the current context, 
the ECB’s monetary policy response to the COVID-19 
crisis, and other support measures implemented by the 
economic authorities, have all contributed to preventing 
them from materialising. Thus, low interest rates, 
liquidity facilities, including the launch of a new TLTRO 
programme and the asset purchase programmes have 
all kept the sovereign risk premium in check, despite the 
increase in government debt, and banks’ funding needs 
have been satisfactorily met in a situation of marked 
economic downturn. These measures have also helped 
reduce the impairment of debtors’ credit quality and the 
contraction in lending by banks, thus avoiding further 
deterioration of the economy and banking solvency.  
However, the notable support provided by monetary policy is 
not without its risks. Many of these derive from a low interest 
rate environment potentially eroding certain elements of bank 
profitability.4 Low profitability in the banking sector poses 
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a The flowchart illustrates how an adverse shock to the financial valuation of the banking sector or the sovereign is transmitted to the other sector 
through different interconnection channels. The initial shock can originate from multiple sources, such as the materialisation of the costs of imbalances 
in the growth of lending in the banking sector, or an adverse shock to the sovereign's tax revenues.
Sovereign -> banking sector transmission channels
— Higher financing cost for the sovereign
— Increased risk perception
— Impairment of sovereign debt held as assets by     
the banking system
— Reduced lending 
— Lower revenue generated by the banking sector
— Downgraded credit quality of agents whose credit     
rating is poorer than the sovereign's
Adverse shock, 
sovereign
Adverse shock, banking 
sector
Banking sector -> sovereign transmission channels
— Expectations of a bank bail-out trigger a drop
in the price of sovereign debt
— Budgetary imbalance due to the cost of a bail-out
— Lower tax revenues due to the contraction in     
lending 
— Downturn in economic activity
Figure  1
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risks to financial stability, through various channels. First, it 
can encourage the search for greater yields by the banking 
sector, by raising or underestimating the risk profile of 
investments. This effect may be magnified as low profitability 
reduces the market value of banks, which discourages 
shareholders from properly assessing the risks.5 Lastly, low 
profitability limits the growth capacity of capital and, therefore, 
of the solvency ratio.
The risks associated with the sovereign-bank nexus are 
therefore very different in an environment of low interest 
rates and GDP growth (persistent, more related to the 
generation and accumulation of interest income) from 
those prevailing during a period of a severe banking or 
sovereign crisis (concentrated in the short term, more 
related to financing costs and loan loss provisions and the 
materialisation of risks).
SOURCES: Banco de España, Instituto de Crédito Oficial, SDW and European Banking Authority.
a Consolidated data. Total deposit institutions.
b Individual data. Sovereign debt refers only to debt securities issued by the sovereign.
c Consolidated data. Total sovereign exposure as a percentage of total assets for the sample of banks reporting for each jurisdiction to the EBA 
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Chart 3
DISTRIBUTION OF SOVEREIGN EXPOSURES AS A % OF TOTAL ASSETS, BY 
COUNTRY (c)
5	 See	S.	Advjiev	and	J.	M.	Serena	(2020),	“Regulatory	capital,	market	capital	and	risk	taking	in	international	bank	lending”,	BIS Working Paper	No	912.	
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In short, the COVID-19 crisis has not entailed any 
significant changes for Spanish banks’ exposure to 
Spanish sovereign risk, and the risk considerations 
identified in pre-pandemic years and associated with the 
low interest rate environment, which are very different from 
the doom-loop dynamics of the 2012 sovereign debt crisis, 
continue to take priority. However, the increase in public 
indebtedness and the important role played by the ICO 
guarantee schemes are an indication of potential 
vulnerabilities that need to be monitored going forward.
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